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Are the New Economy Stocks Independent of the Economy:  
A Comparison of USA and India 
 
 
I. Introduction  
The information and communication technology revolution that is sweeping 
through the world in recent years is said to be transforming the global economy from 
a low productive, manufacture based one to a knowledge based, service oriented, 
highly productive, globalized economy with long run growth potential, where 
productivity growth can be attributed not to the traditional sources but to the 
irreversible advancement in knowledge: a change that is being described as a 
transformation to a 'new' economy from an old one.  
With the advent of e-revolution, the composition of stock market has changed 
significantly in countries that experienced e-revolution.  The new economy sector, 
constituting of computer software and hardware firms, firms providing software and 
hardware services, telecommunication firms, media and entertainment firms, has 
come to dominate and to add values to these nations' stock market.  There has been a 
consensus that the significant stock value increments in those countries are driven by 
the growth rate of the emerging new economy sector. Resultantly, this new situation 
has produced a new set of question.  
In this new economy, does a ‘new mechanism’ now rule so far as stock market 
is concerned? Is this really the initiation of a new era of changed stock price 
behaviour at least in the context of the new economy stocks that characterizes all the 
financial markets that experienced e-revolution irrespective of their level of 
development? While these are questions that require a comprehensive review of our 
understanding of stock market, we, in this article, inquire on the specific issue of 
whether the new economy stocks irrespective of the level of financial development 
across countries are showing similar pattern. This will confirm a special characteristic 
of new economy stocks that holds across countries.  
The study selects two countries namely India and USA that experienced e-
revolution and having different levels of development of stock markets.  While the US 
financial market is one of most developed markets in the world in terms of activity, 
efficiency and growth, the Indian stock market remains a relatively less developed 
financial market.  Both the two economies are related substantially in terms of 
business transactions at least in the context of the emerging new economy sector.  The 
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study explores the trends in movements of the new economy stocks in the two 
countries and seeks to delineate common trends, if any, in the new economy stock 
price movement in the two countries. The presence of common trend will confirm the 
special character of the new economy stocks irrespective of the level of development 
of the financial markets.  
The study selects 1998-2003 as the period of study.  This was the period when 
new economy stocks were gaining significance in the global economy and were 
having profound impact on the very nature of the stock market and its workings. We 
conclude in our study that the movements in the new economy stock prices were quite 
similar in the two countries. To trace trends in new economy stock price movement, 
thirty-seven new economy stocks have been selected for each country.  Stocks have 
been selected from BSE TMT index (for India) [that is the Technology-Media-
Telecommunication Index available in Bombay Stock Exchange] and from NASDAQ 
100 (for USA) on basis of availability of data for the entire study period.  Price data 
(on monthly and yearly basis) and financial data (on yearly basis) have been compiled 
from official website of Bombay Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange.  A 
large volume of financial data has been compiled from official website of these new 
economy firms. 
The trajectory of the paper is the following. Section I inquires whether new 
economy sector has come to constitute a significant sector in the stock markets of the 
two nations.  Section II explores the factors determining the new economy stock 
prices in the two stock markets.  This is analyzed in three ways. First, we employ a 
time series analysis, second, a cross section analysis and, third, a panel data 
estimation technique.  We summarize the results and make a comparative analysis of 
the trends in new economy stock price movements in the two economies. We 
conclude in favor of a presence of bubble. Section III attempts to explore the factors 
leading to the formation of such bubble. 
 
II. New Economy Sector in the Stock Market 
One possible technique to emphasize importance of new economy sector in 
the stock market in recent years could be to pinpoint relative importance of different 
important sectors in influencing activities or movement in stock market.  To be 
precise, the inquiry could be boiled down to an investigation of whether and to what 
extent market returns are influenced by sectoral returns. The return of the sector that 
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explains significantly variations in market return might be identified as a significant 
sector. 
The study works with some stock market indices.  For India, BSE 200 index is 
taken as the market proxy.  Few sectoral indices, namely BSE Information 
Technology Sector index (BSE IT), BSE Fast Moving Consumer Goods Sector index 
(BSE FMCG), BSE Capital Goods Sector Index (BSE CG), BSE Public Sector Unit 
Index (BSE PSU) and BSE Healthcare Sector Index (BSE HC) are chosen to 
represent different important sectors.  For USA, Nasdaq 100 is chosen as the market 
proxy, and NASDAQ Bank Index, NASDAQ Biotechnology Index, NASDAQ 
Computer Index, NASDAQ Industrial Index, NASDAQ Telecommunications Index 
and NASDAQ Other Finance Index are chosen to represent different important 
sectors in US stock market. These indices constituted of a limited number of 
important stocks serve the purpose of quantifying the price movements and reflect the 
sensitivity of the market in an effective manner.   
The study computes individual sector returns along with market returns using 
monthly stock prices.  Returns are defined as:   
                                    
Re t =  Πτ   Πτ −1Πτ −1
−
 
Πt and Πt -1 are prices in period t and t -1 respectively. Theoretically, such returns 
include change in price as well as in dividends.  Due to non availability of monthly 
data on dividends returns include only prices.   
Relative importance of sectors could be checked by regressing market return 
on sectoral returns. But, to form a statistically adequate model the return series should 
first be checked for stationarity.  If all the series contain unit root, the multiple 
regression of one random walk on others is subject to the spurious regression 
phenomenon.  The model will be characterized by an extremely high value of R2 even 
when the explanatory power of the model is low and conventional t tests will tend to 
indicate a relationship between the variables when none is present.  
The results of applying Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) (whenever necessary) tests to the return data using the package Microfit 
(Version Windows 4.0) are presented in Appendix A (table A.1 and table A.2 for 
India, table A.4 and table A.5 for USA).   
The study reveals all return series (both in India and in USA) to contain unit 
roots and to be stationary in their first difference thus invalidating estimation using 
Ordinary Least Square.  This, however, does not imply that the two series are not 
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related.   Many time-series are non-stationary but 'move together' over time.  They 
might be cointegrated, that is, there might exist some influence on the series, which 
imply that the two series are bound by some relationship in the long run. A 
cointegrating relationship is also seen as a long term or equilibrium phenomenon.  
Cointegrated variables may deviate from their relationships in the short run, but their 
association would return in the long run. In this framework, for any sector to be 
significant in the stock market, one should not expect sectoral returns to 'move out of 
line' with market return in the long run, thus implying that individual sectoral returns 
and market return must be cointegrated. 
Testing for cointegrating relationship between market return and individual 
sector returns has been done using Microfit for Windows (version 4.0).  As revealed 
from earlier tests all the return series are integrated of order one.  In the testing 
procedure, one sector is chosen at a time and whether the return of the chosen sector 
is co-integrated with market return is tested using Johansen estimate of the co-
integrating vector.  Selecting number of cointegrating factor to be two and using 
estimation option for trended variable, with an assumed trend in the data generating 
process, we obtain the statistics reported in Appendix A (table A.3 for India, table A.6 
for USA). 
In both the countries, return of the IT sector is strongly cointegrated with that 
of the market return just as in the case of other sectors suggesting a long run 
relationship between IT sector return and market return.  In short run, there may 
appear a lack of association between them, but their association would return in the 
long run.  This establishes the emerging new economy sector as an important sector in 
the stock markets of both the countries along with the other established sectors. 
  It now remains to explore the trend in the movements of the new economy 
stocks in the two markets.  A look at the new economy stock price movement in the 
two markets reveals a common trend.  Year 1998 was the period when new economy 
stocks were gaining importance.  Stock prices experienced a meteoric rise in 1999 and 
2000 followed by a crash.  2001 was a period of downward revision in stock prices 
that continued in 2002 and 2003.  These similarities in price movement invoke further 
inquiry regarding factors influencing new economy stock prices in the two markets.   
 
III. Factors Determining New Economy Stock Prices 
This section investigates the factors behind formation of new economy stock 
prices in the two markets.  In an optimal stock market, fundamentals determine stock 
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prices, that is, any change in stock prices can be significantly explained by financial 
and economic variables.  In case of fundamental determined stock prices, investors 
receive optimal returns in the form of risk free returns plus a risk premium.  The 
deviation between actual stock price and true stock price are random.  In certain 
instances however, speculative factors determine stock prices driving actual prices far 
away from the true price.  This hints formation of 'bubble'.      
 
Time series analysis: 
Dwyer and Hafer (1990) provide the theoretical basis of the model with 
fundamentals and bubbles. In their model, prices are fundamentally determined if 
dividend payments can explain the changes in stock prices.  To be precise, value of 
stocks should be equal to the present value of expected future dividends.  With 
constant expected growth rate in dividends proportional change in stock prices will be 
constant.  Hence, price fluctuations will be random.   
Blanchard and Watson (1982) explain the method of detecting the presence of 
bubble. In any period, actual price deviates from the fundamental price by the bubble. 
In absence of bubbles, fundamentals determine prices.  However, with bubbles, 
proportional change in stock prices could be explained by two terms - proportional 
change in fundamental price and proportional change in bubbles.  With bubble, 
proportional change in stock prices will be an increasing function of time and 
predictable.  This can be tested by regressing proportional change in stock prices on 
time.  One can construct different models to perform this regression analysis.  
Burman (1999) developed a simple model (A) that could be estimated to 
detect presence of bubble. 
ln Pt = a + b.t + c.t2 + et…………..(1) 
Where E(et) = 0 for all t 
            E(etet-1) = 0 and E(et2) = σ2 for all t.  
(1) could be useful for our purpose. The company balance sheets and profit 
and loss accounts provide financial data on annual basis.  Regression analysis based 
on this data set following Dwyer and Hafer (1990) method, would lead to 
unsatisfactory estimated results due to low degrees of freedom.  Stock price data 
however are available on daily, monthly and yearly basis.  With this data set, (1) is 
useful, where proportional changes in stock prices could be regressed over time to 
detect the role of bubble in price formation. In this model if stock prices are 
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fundamental determined, coefficients of t and t2 should not be statistically significant, 
implying that change in stock price cannot be predicted except for a constant growth. 
 Model (1) is estimated by ordinary least square method using data on new 
economy firms, selected earlier.  Detailed results are shown in Appendix B. 
The results reveal significant role of bubble in new economy stock price 
determination, in the two countries.  In both the economies, prices of new economy 
stocks are significantly influenced by time and variation in stock prices could be 
explained solely by variation in time.  This is evident from high values of R2 and 
adjusted R2 and from significant t values for estimated regression coefficient of time 
and (time)2.  The results are summarized in appendix B (table B.1 for India, table B.2 
for the USA).  Thus, it is bubble, not fundamental, that determines new economy 
stock prices.  The contribution of bubble however varies across firms.   Contribution 
of bubble is mild (R2<0.5) for only a few firms in both the economies. In most of the 
cases R2 lies within the range of 0.8 to 0.96.   However, a difference is to be noted.  
The t values (Appendix B), obtained for estimated regression coefficients for time and 
time squared, are all positive in case of USA.  But, in India some of these are positive 
and some are negative. All the t values are however statistically significant. Thus 
while prices are bubble determined, it is not possible to trace any trend in context of 
India.  In USA however, prices are increasing functions of time and hence are 
predictable.   
The presence of bubble, as detected by the time-series analysis, might induce 
us to conclude that the new economy stocks have in general been bubble-determined 
with the stock markets grossly overestimating the stocks.  
However, we should conclude cautiously.  Over a short period as that covered 
in this study, bubbles rather than fundamentals are likely to dominate. The test 
however cannot be extended to long run due to insufficiency of relevant data. 
Moreover, the study follows the approach of Blanchard and Watson (1982), where 
existence of bubble makes proportional changes in stock prices an increasing function 
of time.   This study uses Burman's (1999) model where proportional changes in stock 
prices depend on only two factors, t and t2.   Estimated results depend crucially on the 
specification of the model. A different model specification might alter study results 
significantly. Since the time series analysis does not provide us with non-trivial 
results, it would be better to detect the role of fundamental variables in determining 
stock prices. Scope of any detailed time-series analysis is however limited owing to 
non-availability of sufficient data.  Alternatively, we might resort to cross section 
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analysis testing whether, at a particular point of time, new economy stock prices are 
determined by fundamental economic and financial variables. This is dealt with in the 
following subsection.   
 
Cross Section Analysis 
The cross section analysis inquires whether at every year of the study period 
price formation is based on fundamental economic and financial variables.  Of the 
different fundamental variables portraying the true health of companies, the study 
selects only four.  These are (i) dividend per share (DPS) reflecting the liquidity 
position, investment and growth opportunities of the firm; (ii) net worth per share 
(NWS) or capital accumulated per share reflecting firm's ability or need to raise 
financial capital; (iii) net profit per share (NPS) portraying the health of the company 
and (iv) debt-equity ratio (D/E) measuring the risk associated with the company.  If 
price formation is based on these four fundamental variables then prices can be said to 
have moved according to fundamentals.   
Proportional change in stock prices is regressed on these four fundamental 
variables namely DPS, NPS, NWS and D/E using a simple regression equation like 
(2).  For fundamental determined stock prices, coefficients of DPS, NWS, NPS and 
D/E ratio should be statistically significant. 
 
ln Pi  = Constant + a.(DPS)i + b.(NWS)i + c.(NPS)i + d.(D/E)i + ui ………………(2) 
Where E(ei) = 0 for all i 
            E(eiej) = 0 for i not equal to j and E(ei2) = σ2 for all i. 
There is no problem of multi collinearity in the data.  (2) has been estimated 
using data on selected new economy stocks separately for the two countries and for all 
the six years at four different points namely at opening price, at closing price, at high 
price and at low price.  If at any stage of regression, t ratio for estimated regression 
coefficient for any of the fundamental variables has been found less than unity in 
absolute term, regression has been rerun with the particular variable dropped.  This is 
to improve the adjusted R2 of the model.  The final estimated equation incorporates 
only those fundamental variables whose estimated regression coefficients possess t 
ratios that exceed unity in absolute term.  Adjusted R2 in the final regression equation 
shows the maximum extent to which fundamental variables could explain variations 
in new economy stock prices. The results obtained for successive years are then 
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compared to trace out the trend in price formation over the period of study.  Study 
results are shown in Appendix C. 
Results of the study highlight that the stock market boom of 1998-2000 was 
indeed not being driven by fundamentals in both the markets. The explanatory power 
of the fundamental variables, as is explained by values of R2 and adjusted R2, 
remained low during 1998.  It dwindled to a minimum during 1999 and the first half 
of 2000.  Explanatory power started improving since late 2001 and reached a 
moderate level during 2002-2003.  The inefficacy of fundamental variables in 
explaining variation in stock prices is further revealed by insignificant t values for the 
estimated regression coefficients of fundamental variables.  Even with an 
improvement in the explanatory power of fundamental variables in recent year, role of 
individual fundamental variables, except for NPS and NWS, has not become 
significant. 
Both the time series and cross section analysis pointed towards bubble 
determined new economy stock price in the context of India as well as USA.  There 
are however, certain limitations of time series and cross section analysis.  Resorting to 
panel data estimation that takes into account both the time and spatial dimension of 
data set could enrich any empirical analysis in ways that could not be attained using 
pure time series or pure cross section data.  With its wide spectrum, it provides more 
information, more variability and efficiency, less collinearity among variables, and 
more degrees of freedom.  Moreover, dynamics of change with short time series and 
phenomena such as economies of scale or technical change could be better analyzed 
using panel data.  
 
Panel data analysis  
With data on variables on N cross sectional units for T periods, the relationship 
among variables using the pooled data set might be represented as: 
y(i,t) = a + b.x(i,t) + e(i,t) ………………………(3) 
y(i,t) denotes the dependent variable, i denote cross section identifier and t the time 
identifier. x(i,t) is the vector of explanatory variables for the ith firm in the tth time 
period.  x's are non-stochastic and e(i,t) follows the classical assumptions. 
Data on stock price and financial variables for selected new economy firms (Indian 
and US) for the six-year period 1998-2003, have been used to construct balanced 
panels of 222 observations for each country.  The panel is estimated for each country 
separately at four price points, namely at open price, high price, low price and close 
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price with NPS, DPS, NWS and DE as explanatory variables, using the econometric 
package LIMDEP. In order to decide which model suits the data best, five models are 
defined. 
 
1. y(i,t) = a + e(i,t) (no group effects or xs) 
2. y(i,t) = a(i) + e(i,t) (group dummies only) 
3. y(i,t) = a + b.x(i,t) + e(i,t) (regressors only, the classical model) 
4. The full ‘one-way’ model 
I. The one way FEM (with xs & group effects) described as: 
y(i,t) = a(i) + b.x(i,t) + e(i,t), i = 1,2,….N; t = 1,2,…T, e(i,t) is a classical 
disturbance with E[e(i,t)] = 0 and Var. [e(i,t)] = σ2(e) 
II. The Random effect model described as:  
y(i,t) =  ai + b.x(i,t) + e(i,t); ai = a + ui i = 1,2,……………..N   
or, y(i,t) =  a + b.x(i,t) + ui + e(i,t) 
or, y(i,t) =  a + b. x(i,t) + Wi,t
ai is assumed to be a random variable with mean 'a'. ui is a random error term 
with usual assumptions. This cross-sectional specific error term is 
uncorrelated with the errors of the variables. The random effects model is a 
generalized regression model with the assumptions E[ui ]=0, Var.[ui]=σ2(u),   
Cov[eit, ui ]= 0, Var.[eit + ui ]=σ2 = σ2(e) + σ2(u), Corr[eit + ui , eit + ui]= r = 
σ2(u)/σ2 
5. The full ‘two-way’ model 
I. The two way FEM (with x’s, group effects & time effects) described as: 
y(i,t) =  a0 + a(i) + g(t) + b. x(i,t) + e(i,t), i = 1,2,….N; t = 1,2,…T, e(i,t) is a 
classical disturbance with E[e(i,t)] = 0 and Var. [e(i,t)] = σ2(e). The problem 
of multi collinearity - the time and group dummy variables both sum to one - 
is avoided by imposing the restriction  
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II. The two-way random effect model or Error Components Models with group 
and time effect described as: 
y(i,t) =  a + b. x(i,t) + ui + v (i,t)
v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i) + w(t)  
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with the usual assumptions u(i)~N[0, σ2(u)], e(i,t)~N[0, σ2(e)], w(t)~N[0, 
σ2(w)]. The individual error terms are not correlated with each other and are 
not auto correlated across both cross section and time series units. The cross-
section specific error affects only the observations in that panel. The time-
specific error component is peculiar to all observations for that time period t. 
The third eit affects only the particular observation.  
 
Chi-squared statistics based on the likelihood functions and F statistics based on the 
sums of squares are used to choose among models (1) to (5).  Breusch and Pagan's 
Lagrange multiplier statistic is used for testing FEM/REM against CLRM.  Hausman's 
chi-squared statistic is used for testing the REM against FEM. 
Panel data findings are listed in appendix D (table D.I.1 – table D.I.6 for India, 
table D.II.1 – table D.II.3 for USA).  While investigating the nature of price formation 
for new economy stocks, the study considers two financial markets.  The basis 
characteristics of the two markets differ substantially.  The US stock market is one of 
the most integrated and developed markets with considerable depth.  The Indian stock 
market on the contrary is not so developed and lags substantially in terms of depth 
even in the era of financial liberalization.  In both the markets, as suggest the results 
of the study, new economy firms do possess some 'individuality' that is each firm has 
a special characteristic of its own. This is evident from the Lagrange Multiplier Test 
by which FEM/REM is favoured over classical linear regression model at all price 
points.  The nature of 'individuality' however differs in the two markets.  In Indian 
context, the two way model with explanatory variables as well as group effect and 
time effect (model 5) is superior to other models at all price points.  This is suggested 
by likelihood ratio test and F test. Further, the Hausman statistic suggests superiority 
of FEM over REM at all the four price points.  The presence of significant 'group 
effect' and 'time effect' confirms that firms are distinct in the sense that factors 
influencing price formation mechanism of one firm seems to be unique for that firm 
and the factors change significantly over time.  In US stock market, the situation is 
different. Although FEM/REM is favoured over classical linear regression model at 
all price points, REM is superior to FEM.  Firms do have 'individuality' but the 
differences are random.  They are, as if, random drawing from a much larger 
population.  There seems to exist, some general rule or general set of factors that 
influence price formation mechanism of the sector.  Within the sector, price formation 
mechanism of one firm differs from that of others, but the difference is purely 
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random.  This difference in stock price behaviour might reflect the differences in 
depth and nature of the two markets.  In a developed stock market, investors are 
supposed to be better informed due to availability of better signal sent by the market. 
In a not so developed market, it might be difficult for the investors to frame any 
general rule regarding price formation mechanism of firms. 
Panel data estimation reveals another significant result. Whatever be the 
degree and extent of development, efficiency and depth of the stock market, new 
economy stock prices have never been fundamental determined.  The presence of 
non-economic factors in price formation mechanism is asserted by the insignificant 
role of fundamental variables in stock price determination in both the markets.  It is 
speculation and herd behavior which could explain new economy stock price 
movement over the period of study.  Nature and extent of speculation however might 
differ across the markets.  Now it remains to be seen what possibly led to the 
formation of bubble in case of the new economy stock prices? Does the formation of 
bubble have to do with a change in the very mechanism through which the stock 
market behavior is understood to be operating?  
 
IV. Bubbles in New Economy Stock Prices: A Possible Explanation 
A typical bubble begins with a 'precipitating factor' such as development of 
something that seems unique to the investors.  Then follows an 'amplification 
mechanism', generally in the form of assertions from media, reinforcing the view 
(Farlow, 2002). The resulting stock price increase generates optimism pushing up 
prices further. As the bubble takes its course, investors, being more convinced about 
the dawn of a 'new era' where traditional methods of stock valuation do not apply, try 
to justify even the most unusual valuations.  
The global new economy stock price boom during 1998-2000 was driven 
mostly by the enthusiasm for the new economy created by the assertions of the 
emerging 'new economy paradigm'.  The paradigm claims the new technology and 
globalization to have ushered in a new economic era of faster, stable and inflation free 
growth and hence stronger profit. The old pattern of boom and slump is claimed to 
disappear leading to a transformation of the markets. Most of the future growth 
potential was expected to be in the new economy reducing economic significance of 
the other sectors. Ultimately, as claimed by the paradigm, the new economy will 
penetrate other sectors of the economy.  
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One possible explanation for the formation of bubble in new economy stock 
prices during 1998-2000 could be that the optimism fed by the assertions of new 
economy paradigm changed the nature and composition of investment in stock 
market. In a stock market, there are two types of investors: the momentum investors 
and the value investors. Momentum investors buy stocks with the sole purpose of 
making profit by selling the stocks, quickly to other investors, at a higher price.  The 
only consideration for them is not the net present value of the stock but the changes in 
stock prices. The 'value investors', in expectation of high future dividends, identify 
and invest in companies whose worth is not yet reflected in the share prices and thus, 
pick up only 'value stocks' with positive net present value where prices are related to 
underlying fundamentals. The isolation of new economy sector as the 'sector of the 
future' and the resulting perceived growth opportunity of new economy stocks 
allowed them to sell at high prices. The initial increase generated expectations of 
further increase and attracted new buyers – normally speculators or what we might 
call momentum investors.  Replacement of value investment by momentum 
investment hastened speculating activities pushing up prices much above the earning 
capacity.     
The fact that the bubble was almost entirely in the new economy stocks in 
both the countries under consideration confirms the presence of momentum 
investment in the new economy sector.  The stock price behaviour during 1999-2000 
was different from the bubble preceding the 1929 crash, or the "Nifty Fifty" bubble of 
the 1970s.  In both the cases, almost all the stocks were over-valued.   
Traditional asset price theory suggests that the presence of even a few 
'rational' agents betting against the bubble might stop it in its track (Farlow, 2002).  
This corrective mechanism however did not trigger in case of new economy stocks 
and the 'rational' value investors found it difficult to regain dominance over the 
momentum investors.  In general, it is difficult for the corrective behaviour to set in.  
Betting against a bubble before it corrects itself is risky unless the rational investors 
could coordinate in sufficient numbers against it.  However, a growing bubble creates 
returns to those who stay in; the greater the returns, the larger the number who need to 
coordinate against it to correct it.  “Rational” behaviour does not naturally come to 
dominate the population.    
Similar was the case with new economy stocks.  The strong line of defense of the 
new economy paradigm could have made it difficult for the 'value' investment to 
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regain dominance over the momentum investment and for the corrective mechanism 
against bubble to set in.  The assertions were manifold, such as: 
• New technology is expected to bring about significant improvement in the real 
economy and the resultant productivity increase could justify the valuations of 
new economy stocks.  The assertion that the new technology is boosting growth 
and the bubble, if present in the market, will never burst, was the catchword of the 
new economy paradigm.   
• New economy stocks are 'growth' stocks that cannot be evaluated by standard 
tests. Such stocks are often sold at multiples as their prices move with 'perceived' 
growth opportunity.  Technology firms with diverse growth opportunity choose 
low, often zero debt equity ratio and normally pay out nothing as dividend to 
ensure investment in positive NPV projects. Thus, technology stock prices might 
not react to change in leverage or in dividend policies.  
• For long duration assets such as equity, it is inappropriate to judge bubble on basis 
of immediate price action because PDV of a stock depends crucially on long term 
cash flows. While evaluating the rationality of price of any 'long-lived asset', the 
time horizon must be sufficiently extended to include long-term cash flows in 
stock price evaluation.  New economy stock prices might rise sufficiently in future 
to justify the high prices in late 1999 or in early 2000 (Siegel, 2000). 
 
The increased optimism and inflow of momentum investment pushed up prices to 
levels that even the most zealous supporter of new economy paradigm found hard to 
rationalize.  The bubble burst when the optimism of the short-term, momentum 
investors was reversed.  
The traditional models of asset price determination based on rationality 
assumption thus cannot explain movement in the new economy stock prices.  The 
study further predicts that even if growth stocks dominate in the new era, bubble 
might still develop. Any over-estimation of the growth opportunity might again invite 
momentum investment inviting another stock market slide.  Moreover, this razor edge 
stability in the stock market in the new economy could have significant psychological 
impact on the real economy producing profound disequilibrium. The formation of 
bubble in one part of the economy distorts the flow of funds through out the economy 
making the flow of funds biased to that sector.  The bursting of bubble could produce 
growing pessimism in the economy constraining real economy activities and the 
severity of the disequilibrium would hinge upon the strength of nexus between 
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financial sector and the real sector.  However, this issue is not addressed in our study.  
Our study has pointed to a new era of functional instability, or rather razor-edge 
stability, embedded in the stock market.  New models need to be developed in order 
to explain the causes of functional instability and to gauge the impact of this 
instability on underlying real economy. 
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Appendix A:                     
Table: A.1(Case for India) 
Unit Root Test (56 observations: 1999M3 to 2003M10) 
Variables Test Statistic 
Return BSE 200 index ADF(12) -1.5821 
Return BSE IT index ADF(9) -2.3853 
Return BSE PSU index ADF(12) -2.2506 
Return BSE CG index ADF(12) -2.2216 
Return BSE HC index ADF(12) -0.96546 
Return BSE FMCG index ADF(10) -1.8668 
95% Critical Value for the Dickey-Fuller Statistic = -3.5162 
Table: A.2 (Case for India) 
Unit root test (55 observations: 1999M4 to 2003M10) 
Variables in first difference Test Statistic 
Return BSE 200 index DF -10.4685 
Return BSE IT index ADF(12) -3.6114 
Return BSE PSU index ADF(9) -3.6506 
Return BSE CG index DF -10.0711 
Return BSE HC index DF -20.6903 
Return BSE FMCG index DF -10.8190 
95% Critical Value for the Dickey-Fuller Statistic = -3.5189 
Table: A.3 Johansen Tests for Co-integration (Case for India) 
 (With unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend in the VAR) 
(54 observations: 1999M5 to 2003M10) 
Trace Maximum eigenvalue List of variables included in the  
cointegrating vector 
r = 0 r <=1 r = 0 r <=1 
Return BSE 200, Return BSE IT 35.17* 15.72* 19.45* 15.72* 
Return BSE 200, Return BSE PSU 36.91* 18.11* 18.81* 18.11* 
Return BSE 200, Return BSE CG 44.02* 17.03* 26.99* 17.03* 
Return BSE 200, Return BSE FMCG 60.86* 18.83* 42.02* 18.83* 
Return BSE 200, BSE Return HC 48.84* 19.96* 28.88* 19.96* 
The columns labeled r = 0 test a null hypothesis of no cointegration, while the r <= 1 
columns test a null of at most one cointegrating vector.  * denotes rejection of the null at 
5% level of significance. 
 
Table A.4 (Case for USA) 
Unit Root Test (71 observations: 1998M2 to 2003M12) 
Variables Test Statistic 
Return Nasdaq 100 Index ADF(10) -1.7156      
Return Nasdaq Bank Index ADF(6) -2.5217 
Return Nasdaq Biotech Index ADF(11) -1.6897 
Return Nasdaq Computer Index ADF(10) -1.7439 
Return Nasdaq Financial Index ADF(6) -2.7318 
Return Nasdaq Industrial Index ADF(12) -3.1351 
Return Nasdaq Telecom Index ADF(10) -1.5384 
95% Critical Value for the Dickey-Fuller Statistic = -3.4889 
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 Table A.5 (Case for USA) 
Unit root test (70 observations : 1998M3 to 2003M12) 
Variables in first difference Test Statistic 
Return Nasdaq 100 Index DF -12.6636  
Return Nasdaq Bank Index DF  -12.6330      
Return Nasdaq Biotech Index ADF(1) -7.5822 
Return Nasdaq Computer Index ADF(10) -1.7439 
Return Nasdaq Financial Index ADF(4) -3.5624  
Return Nasdaq Industrial Index DF  -16.5731 
Return Nasdaq Telecom Index DF -15.5358 
95% Critical Value for the Dickey-Fuller Statistic = -3.4889 
 
Table A.6 Johansen Tests for Co-integration (Case for USA) 
With unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend in the VAR 
(69 observations:1998M4 to 2003M12) 
Trace Maximum eigenvalue List of variables included in the  
cointegrating vector 
r = 0 r <=1 r = 0 r <=1 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Bank 54.61* 18.79* 35.80* 18.79* 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Biotech 70.76* 22.89* 47.86* 22.89* 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Computer 79.28* 27.62* 51.66* 27.62* 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Financial 49.20* 12.11* 37.09* 12.11* 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Industrial 91.26* 25.35* 65.91* 25.35* 
Return Nasdaq 100, Return Telecom 57.47* 26.85* 30.63* 26.85* 
The columns labeled r = 0 test a null hypothesis of no cointegration, while the r <= 1 
columns test a null of at most one cointegrating vector.  * denotes rejection of the null at 5% 
level of significance. 
 
Appendix B: Table B.1 Results of Time series Analysis (Case for India) 
Company  t values  R2 Company t values  R2
 Const. Time Time2   Const. Time Time2  
Aptech 63.6 -4.03 -6.95 0.60 MTNL 90.7 -3.52 -2.70 0.39
Aftek 44.8 5.06 -9.94 0.73 NIIT 139.4 -1.88 -11.72 0.77
BSEL 48.9 -11.66 -9.8 0.87 Penta G 60.6 -15.4 -6.60 0.91
CMC 59.6 -2.94 2.24 0.49 Penta Soft 60.6 -15.4 -6.60 0.91
Compucom 46.9 -11.21 0.96* 0.88 Polaris 51.2 -5.87 -1.89* 0.63
Crest com 44.8 5.06 -9.94 0.73 Psi Data 70.2 2.52 -10.71 0.76
Cybertech 34.3 -18.06 2.79 0.94 Ramco 59.1 -9.06 2.00* 0.87
DSQ 44.4 -6.83 -7.42 0.76 Ram Info 48.6 -0.8* -13.13 0.79
Digital Glob 67.5 3.49 -6.67 0.65 Rolta 63.1 9.27 -10.82 0.83
Finolex 74.9 2.85 -4.64 0.49 Satyam 64.7 0.31* -10.43 0.72
Geom Soft 48.6 -11.13 4.58 0.88 Silverline 37.3 -8.67 -4.15 0.83
Him F Com 40.6 -9.25 -5.80 0.83 Sonata 37.3 -8.90 -7.91 0.83
Hugh soft 60.7 -11.61 -3.54 0.88 Tata Info 104.1 -2.52 -5.44 0.59
Hugh Tele 57.3 -3.11 -0.23* 0.37 Tata Elxsi 80.5 7.71 -8.90 0.77
ITI 22.7 -5.00 -2.04* 0.66 Trigyn Tech 42.7 -3.07 -4.71 0.42
Infosys 140.2 10.13 -7.90 0.80 Usha Beltron 15.8 -7.40 2.90 0.88
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Mastek 50.0 1.60* -10.09 0.71 VSNL 73.6 -3.38 -5.72 0.51
Moser Baer 45.9 0.69* -1.92* 0.11 Wipro 62.3 -3.53 -2.32 0.39
     ZEE 66.3 -3.27 -11.87 0.78
 
Table B.2 Results of Time series Analysis: Case for USA 
 t values  t values   
Company  Const Time  Time2 R2 Company Const. Time  Time2 R2
Adobe 8.24 4.90 -3.15 0.60 Interactive 46.55 1.68* -3.67 0.62
Amazon 9.00 12.6 -11.5 0.79 Level 3 C 4.73 16.24 -14.45 0.87
Amgen 72.5 5.00 -12.3 0.96 Linear 42.85 4.38 -8.198 0.86
Apple 18.0 5.47 -6.01 0.46 Maxim 34.40 20.90 -24.6 0.33
Applied 22.5 4.87 -7.36 0.76 Mercury 17.74 4.29 -6.97 0.77
ATY Tech 14.4 2.85 -2.1 0.26 Microchip 28.47 0.83* -3.36 0.71
BEA 10.0 1.2* -3.10 0.58 Microsoft 41.39 14.12 -6.50 0.40
Broadcom 14.0 6.80 -8.39 0.69 Network 9.20 7.10 -8.63 0.69
Check Point 16.8 1.5* -4.93 0.82 Nextel 11.44 7.74 -8.41 0.62
Cisco 19.1 10.6 -11.9 0.78 Nov 27.61 1.03* -3.69 0.73
Comcast 41.3 1.42 -1.2* 0.08 Oracle 15.07 3.36 -6.04 0.76
Compuware 12.4 3.58 -1.7* 0.59 People Soft 30.13 -6.81 6.89 0.51
Dell 28.3 8.78 -9.06 0.65 Qualcom 17.30 3.95 -7.14 0.82
e Bay 13.7 5.47 -7.75 0.74 Scandisk 6.90 5.03 -6.45 0.60
Echostar 18.1 5.64 -9.72 0.88 Sebl 14.10 3.58 -6.04 0.73
Electronics 43.9 -4.1 1.18* 0.77 Sun Micro 14.60 9.05 -11.41 0.81
Flex 27.0 4.30 -8.60 0.88 Veritas 15.90 4.03 -6.28 0.71
Intel 30.0 6.70 -7.96 0.64 Yahoo 5.921 13.02 -12.58 0.79
 
Appendix C: Results of Cross section Analysis: India versus USA 
‘*’ denotes significance at 5%level of significance for all tables 
t values of estimated regression coefficients  1998 NPS DPS NWS DE 22
India  Dropped 1.7 1.3 Dropped 0.16 Open price USA 2.42* -1.85 1.78 Dropped 0.21 
India  1.27 dropped 1.59 Dropped 0.10 High Price USA 1.12 -1.78 1.46 Dropped 0.04 
India  Dropped 1.57 1.42 Dropped 0.14 Low Price USA 3.2* -1.36 Dropped Dropped 0.22 
India  1.32 dropped  1.47 Dropped 0.09 Close Price USA 1.91 -1.29 dropped Dropped 0.06 
 
t values for estimated regression coefficients  1999 NPS DPS NWS DE Adj.R2
India  Dropped 1.20 1.52 Dropped 0.06 Open price USA 1.08 -1.35 Dropped 1.12 0.02 
India  Dropped 1.38 1.52 1.03 0.05 High Price USA 1.35 -1.74 1.06 1.20 0.05 
India  Dropped 1.17 1.61 Dropped 0.07 Low Price USA 1.91 Dropped Dropped 1.00 0.08 
India  Dropped 1.17 1.81 1.23 0.07 Close Price USA 1.19 -2.12* 1.26 1.02 0.08 
 
 18
t values for estimated regression coefficients  2000 NPS DPS NWS DE Adj.R2
India  1.7 1.19 -1.86 Dropped 0.06 Open price 
USA -1.40 Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.002 
India  1.49 1.07 -1.47 Dropped 0.008 High Price USA -1.00 Dropped Dropped Dropped -0.01 
India  1.65 1.58 -1.3 Dropped 0.06 Low Price USA Dropped 1.29 1.18 Dropped 0.03 
India  1.58 1.61 -1.19 Dropped 0.06 Close Price USA 0.49 Dropped Dropped Dropped -0.02 
 
t values for estimated regression coefficients  2001 NPS DPS NWS DE Adj.R2
India  1.59 1.02 Dropped Dropped 0.06 Open price USA Dropped 0.60 Dropped Dropped -0.02 
India 2.39* Dropped -1.19 Dropped 0.10 High Price USA Dropped 0.46 Dropped Dropped -0.02 
India  2.38* 1.48 Dropped -1.78 0.22 Low Price USA 2.83* 1.14 2.07* Dropped 0.41 
India  3.21* 1.31 Dropped -1.8 0.30 Close Price 
USA Dropped 2.31* Dropped 3.14* 0.31 
 
t values for estimated regression coefficients  2002 NPS DPS NWS DE Adj.R2
India  4.45* -3.51* -4.62* Dropped 0.46 Open price USA Dropped Dropped 1.36 2.25* 0.13 
India  4.02* -3.01* -4.16* Dropped 0.39 High Price USA Dropped Dropped 1.55 2.35* 0.15 
India  4.22* -3.04* -4.33* Dropped 0.38 Low Price USA Dropped Dropped 2.36 1.70 0.16 
India  3.93* -3.02* -4.03* Dropped 0.33 Close Price USA Dropped Dropped 1.73 1.62 0.10 
 
t values for estimated regression coefficients  2003 NPS DPS NWS DE Adj.R2
India  3.71* -1.17 2.6* Dropped 0.26 Open price USA 3.76* Dropped Dropped -1.42 0.33 
India  3.36* Dropped 2.07* Dropped 0.25 High Price USA 2.75* Dropped Dropped -1.90 0.26 
India  3.75* Dropped  2.53* Dropped 0.28 Low Price USA 4.01* Dropped Dropped -1.35 0.35 
India  3.52* -1.05 2.31* Dropped 0.26 Close Price USA 2.42 Dropped Dropped -2.19 0.25 
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Appendix D 
Table D.I.1. Panel Data Estimation Results (Case for India) 
Observations:  222 Parameters: 47 Degree of freedom: 175 
Table: D.I.1 Open price High price Low price Close price 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.84 0.87 
Adjusted R2  0.71 0.78 0.79 0.84 
Model test:  F[46,175](prob) 12.84(0.00) 17.96(0.0) 19.35(0.0) 26.03(0.00)
Log-L  -282.89 -246.03 -246.69 -220.23 
Restricted(b=0) Log-L - 447.35 -440.24 -447.81 -449.47 
LogAm PrCrt 0.141 -0.191 -0.185 -0.424 
Akaike Info.  Crt. 2.972 2.640 2.646 2.407 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i, t) - 0.036 0.115 0.178 0.039 
 
Table D.I.2: t ratios for explanatory variables (Case for India) 
Variable DPS NWS NPS DE Constant 
Open price 0.43 0.07 -0.63 -1.03 52.48 
High price  -0.13 1.61 -0.43 -0.42 67.36 
Low price -0.21 1.7 -0.49 -0.49 54.28 
Close price -0.45 1.5 -0.27 -0.56 67.55 
 
Table D.I.3: Test Statistics for the Classical Model (Case for India) 
 Likelihood Ratio Test  
(Prob. Values) 
F Tests  
(Prob. Values) 
 Open 
price 
High 
price 
Low  
price 
Close 
price 
Open 
price 
High 
price 
Low  
price 
Close 
 price 
(2) Vs (1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(3) Vs (1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(4) Vs (1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(4) Vs (2) 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 
(4) Vs (3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(5) Vs (4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(5) Vs (3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table D.I.4: Test Statistics for the Classical Model (Case for India) 
 LM statistic Hausman Statistic 
Open price 185.84 (2 df, prob value = 0.00)  24.60 (4df, prob value = 0.00) 
High price 240.32 (2 df, prob value= 0.00) 14.74 (4df, prob value = 0.00) 
Low price 223.02 (2 df, Prob value = 0.00) 12.75 (4df, prob value = 0.01) 
Close price 278.83 (2 df, prob value = 0.00) 23.51 (4df, prob value = 0.00) 
(High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model, High values of H favor FEM) 
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Table D.I.5. Estimated Fixed Effects (Case for India) 
t ratios 
Intercept dummies Differential  dummies (Infosys base) 
Prices 
Group Open High Low Close Open High Low Close 
Ace -4.63 -4.24 -5.16 -4.6 18.43 18.01 22.30 20.38 
Aptech 0.13 -1.62 -0.11 2.23 10.98 13.92 14.42 9.70 
Amex 0.08 1.01 1.03 -2.5 11.03 9.77 12.59 17.09 
Atcom -1.46 -1.34 -3.42 -2.74 13.35 13.36 19.48 17.37 
Compucom -0.78 -1.47 -0.51 -1.34 12.39 13.68 15.01 15.28 
Crest Comm -1.07 -0.55 -1.22 -0.62 12.89 12.26 16.17 14.19 
Data pro -4.80 -4.78 -7.74 -6.38 18.70 18.88 26.39 23.21 
data soft -5.33 -4.5 -6.94 -5.79 19.54 18.42 25.11 22.26 
Digital Eqp 2.48 2.71 3.97 3.39 7.25 7.10 7.97 7.84 
Finolex 0.80 0.32 1.56 0.66 9.74 10.70 11.55 11.94 
Frontier -8.03 -8.25 -10.35 -8.97 23.85 24.38 30.54 27.30 
Infosys 7.01 7.14 8.94 8.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Infotech 1.51 2.39 1.97 2.23 8.80 7.62 11.14 9.68 
KLG Sys -1.43 -0.61 -0.92 -0.31 13.43 12.33 15.67 13.66 
Maars -1.34 -1.41 -1.14 -1.08 13.29 13.59 16.01 14.89 
Mastek 2.95 3.19 3.02 3.27 6.54 6.37 9.49 8.06 
Mphasis 2.11 2.11 2.90 3.24 7.50 7.70 9.23 7.66 
MTNL 0.75 0.06 1.66 0.61 10.00 11.30 11.65 12.25 
NIIT 3.78 3.6 4.76 4.1 5.27 5.75 6.79 6.79 
Odyssey -3.91 -2.5 -3.62 -2.65 17.32 15.29 19.91 17.33 
Onward -0.36 -0.44 -1.15 -0.74 11.78 12.09 16.07 14.38 
Orient -1.00 -0.49 -1.28 -0.66 12.77 12.15 16.26 14.23 
Pentamedia 1.41 0.97 0.58 -0.3 8.97 9.87 13.33 13.67 
PSI Data 1.88 1.5 1.50 1.35 8.19 9.00 11.84 11.04 
Ram Info -2.78 -3.56 -4.66 -3.99 15.53 16.96 21.54 19.45 
Rolta -0.45 0.23 0.08 0.23 11.87 11.01 14.10 12.81 
Satyam 1.96 3.19 3.43 3.15 8.11 6.40 8.87 8.27 
SSI 1.04 -0.15 1.09 1.48 9.04 11.19 11.90 10.27 
Sri Adhikari 0.50 -0.64 1.23 -0.21 10.40 12.39 12.31 13.53 
Tata Elxsi -0.68 -0.67 -0.31 -0.17 12.26 12.43 14.72 13.45 
Tata Info 1.36 2.32 3.31 2.69 9.07 7.78 9.09 9.01 
Trigyn 1.66 1.26 0.42 0.25 8.58 9.43 13.60 12.81 
TVS -0.02 -1.06 -1.59 -1.09 11.08 12.92 16.59 14.76 
VSNL 1.08 2.11 2.98 2.28 8.51 6.98 8.16 8.37 
Wipro 5.10 4.96 7.03 5.68 3.01 3.44 2.99 4.10 
Zee 2.14 1.73 2.13 1.9 7.47 8.33 10.47 9.84 
Zenith -1.56 -2.32 -3.40 -2.84 13.59 14.98 19.52 17.60 
 
Table D.I.6. Estimated Fixed Effects (case for India) 
t ratios 
Intercept dummies Differential  dummies (1998 base)  
Prices 
Year  Open  High  Low  Close  Open  High Low  Close  
1998 -3.25 -1.09 -1.81 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1999 1.54 5.35 3.36 8.78 -20.37 -27.28 -21.92 -35.30 
2000 7.10 6.79 5.43 2.23 -44.01 -33.55 -30.78 -7.67 
2001 0.30 -2.86 -2.65 -5.05 -15.19 7.35 3.38 23.09 
2002 -2.22 -3.21 -4.06 -3.62 -4.05 9.25 9.89 17.39 
2003 -3.37 -4.88 -0.25 -2.69 0.84 16.41 -6.48 13.36 
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II. Panel Data Estimation Results (Case for USA) 
 
Table D.II.1: Test Statistics for the Classical Model (Case for USA) 
 
 LM statistic Hausman Statistic 
Open price 185.84 (2 df, prob value = 0.00) 4.60 (4df, prob value = 0.29) 
High price 186.99 (2 df, prob value= 0.00) 5.12 (4df, prob value = 0.28) 
Low price 175.14 (2 df, Prob value = 0.00) 5.48 (4df, prob value = 0.24) 
Close price 186.87 (2 df, prob value = 0.00) 0.76 (4df, prob value = 0.94) 
 
 
Table D.II.2: b/St.Error for fundamental variables (Case for USA) 
 
Variable DPS NWS NPS DE Constant 
Open price 0.25 0.47 0.16 -1.26 52.48 
High price  0.44 1.59 1.38 -0.49 18.04 
Low price 0.26 1.75 1.89 0.79 24.72 
Close price 0.61 0.88 1.79 0.66 22.62 
 
Table D.II.3: GLS Estimates (Case for USA) 
 Open Price High Price Low Price Close Price 
Var[e] 0.954350D+00 0.601005D+00 0.294059D+00 0.318146D+00
Var[u] 0.218723D+01 0.665011D-01 0.143090D+00 0.927872D-01  
Var[w] 0.295443D+01 0.148965D+01 0.780311D+00 0.934508D+00
Sum of Sq 0.722685D+03 0 .179577D+03 0.111723D+03 0.109950D+03
R-squared 0.569545D-01   0.143353D-01   0.132259D+00  0.461992D-01   
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